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BOOK REVIEWS
TIME CHANGES: A REVIEW OF To THE END OF TIME: THE
SEDUCTION AND CONQUEST OF A MEDIA EMPIRE

By RICHARD M. CLURMAN

Jayne W. Barnard*
Back in the 1950s, Henry Luce, legendary founder of Time
Magazine, was reviewing a business story for an upcoming issue.
Disgusted by the tale of greed which unfolded, Luce scrawled across
the top of the page,
I resent the fact that these men are fighting for a huge
chunk of the "national estate" without there seeming to be
any point to the fight. None seems to stand for a damn
thing. This is the sort of thing that turns one against
capitalism. I resent having these great companies owned by
pointless men like these.'
Indeed. If there is a theme to Richard Clurman's book on the 1990
marriage between Time, Inc. and Warner Communications, it is that
the men involved in making the deal were not only pointless, or at
least shallow, as individuals but remarkably obtuse about their
fiduciary obligations to the shareholders of their respective companies.
Over and over throughout the book, Clurman portrays the toplevel
managers of Time, Chairman J. Richard Munro and President N.J.
"Nick" Nicholas, and Warner's CEO Steve Ross, as focusing on all
the wrong questions as they put together the biggest media merger
in history. These men's obsessions turned not on how to generate
shareholder value, or even on how to accommodate the conflicting
claims of their companies' "other constituencies," but on how to ensure
that each would get the best managerial contract, the highest position
on the corporate ladder, and the best executive compensation package
when the deal was done. Clurman's descriptions of the machinations,
tantrums, tears and tea leaves which ultimately led to the Time* Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary.
Thanks to Lisa Nicholson and Joe English, both members of the class of 1993, for research
assistance.
1. RICHARD CLURMAN, TO
MEDIA EMPIRE 30-31 (1991).
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Warner merger 2 make for sorrowful reading to anyone who values the
notion of responsible corporate governance.
The outline of the Time-Warner story is by now well known, having
received the full attention of the Delaware Supreme Court 3 and lengthy
feature coverage in The New Yorker. 4 In 1987, Time's management
began paying close attention to the growing number of hostile takeovers in the television industry. Time was, by then, deeply involved in
cable franchising and was the owner of HBO and Cinemax. Anxious
about their own security, the "Time-incers" set about to find a merger
partner that would enhance Time's position in the global media market,
strengthen its lackluster management and, not incidently, serve as a
shark-repellent. After considering and rejecting a possible merger
with Gannett, Time's management turned to the possibility of a merger
with Warner.
Having concluded that Warner would be a good fit, 5 Time's Munro
and Nicholas then undertook a campaign to persuade the board that
a Time-Warner combination would not only enhance Time's market
position but also could be effectuated without compromising the editorial integrity of the magazines, especially Time. This latter consideration was of special importance to Time director Henry R. Luce III,
heir of Henry Jr. and owner of 4 1/2% of the outstanding Time, Inc.
stock.
Slowly and methodically, Munro and Nicholas persuaded Time's
twelve outside board members to accept the idea of entering into a
"transforming transaction."'6 In July 1988, after months of massaging,
the board gave its "go ahead" to actively pursue a merger with Warner.
Weeks of negotiations followed, focusing on such issues as the name
of the combined companies, the exchange ratio and the formula for

2. The use of the term "merger" is generic. As will be seen, the transaction between Time
and Warner was technically something quite different.
3. Paramount Communications v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
4. Connie Bruck, Deal of the Year, NEW YORKER, Jan. 8, 1990, at 67.
5. For example,
Warner had just acquired Lorimar and its film studios. Time-Warner could make
movies and television for use on HBO. Warner had an international distribution
system, which Time could use to sell films, videos, books and magazines. Warner
was a giant in the music and recording business, an area into which Time wanted
to expand. None of the other companies considered had the musical clout of Warner.
Time and Warner's cable systems were compatible and could be easily integrated;
none of the other companies considered presented such a compatible cable partner.
Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1144-45.
6. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 147.
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corporate governance. This last, "succession" issue, was the dealbreaker, however, as Ross, reportedly in tears, refused to sign on to
an agreement that would permit him to act as "co-CEO" of the combined companies but would require him to retire within five years of
the merger. 7 Ross felt this provision reflected Time's lack of confidence
in his leadership, when in fact it really reflected Nick Nicholas' insistence that he, the other designated "co-CEO," would be assured the
top position before he became too old to make his mark.8
Talks between Time and Warner resumed in January 1989. Ultimately, both boards approved a merger to be submitted to the companies' shareholders. The terms of the deal were very similar to those
discarded the previous summer. Nicholas and Ross would serve as
co-CEO's, with Ross ultimately becoming chairman and Nicholas becoming sole CEO. As the deal neared completion, however, a new
and very threatening player arrived on the scene. Sixteen days before
the scheduled shareholder vote, Paramount Communications announced a cash tender offer for all the shares of Time at $175 per
share ($50 above the estimated value of the Warner merger to Time
shareholders of $125), 9 conditioned upon the termination of the merger
agreement.10
Paramount quickly raised its offer to $200 per share, the stock
market went crazy with desire, and Time responded by quickly cobbling together a new deal with Warner. Instead of merging with Warner,
or canceling the deal and letting the market take its course (presumably, but not necessarily, in favor of the Paramount offer), Time agreed
to borrow close to $10 billion, virtually overnight, and use the funds
to buy a majority of Warner's outstanding stock at $70 per share, a
55% premium over market." The beauty of this deal was that it would
not require shareholder approval and could still derail the Paramount
offer. The downside, of course, was that the debt incurred to finance
the buyout would severely impair the combined companies' ability to
grow into the next century.

7. Id. at 168.
8. One board member recalls this issue somewhat differently. Not only was Time committed
to putting Nicholas into the driver's seat as soon as possible; it was also concerned that, unless
forced to do so, Ross might not leave. According to Time director Donald Perkins, "[w]hat we
were concerned about was [Ross'] refusal to talk about retirement. It was like getting in bed
with Armand Hammer ..
" Id. at 172.
9. The Monks/Dingman Time Warner Letters, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, winter 1989, at 24.
10. ParamountCommunications, 571 A.2d at 1147.
11. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 237.
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The public explanation for Time's choice of Warner over Paramount
was that the Warner transaction "offered a greater long-term value
for the stockholders and, unlike Paramount's offer, did not pose a
threat to Time's survival and its 'culture.' "12 Hindsight now tells us
that both these beliefs were misplaced, if not knowingly false when
advanced. While, as of June 1989, Paramount was offering $200 in
cash, the Time-Warner deal could offer only the hope of future price
increases as a result of the combined companies' synergy. In fact, that
synergy has never paid off. After the merger, Time-Warner's share
price never rose above $12413 and as of March 1992, was hovering at

$105.
As for the unique "Time culture," Time's magazine-focused managers never again enjoyed the position of power they had commanded
in the post-Luce years. Only a few weeks passed after the merger
before Time's executives moved from their dowdy headquarters to
the upscale Warner Communications building.1 4 More importantly, it
was not long after the merger that Warner's financial team outpaced
Time's and seized strategic control of the combined companies.15 This
shift in control led ultimately to the forced resignation of Nick
Nicholas, the designated heir to the Time-Warner throne, when he
found in early 1992 that he could not accept (or, worse, even influence)
the Warner-dominated strategic plan.16
Some themes of Clurman's book do not bear directly on questions
of corporate governance. There is, for example, the issue of social
class. Clurman, himself an Ivy Leaguer in spirit if not in fact,17 and
a former chief of correspondents at Time, repeatedly points out the
gaucheries of the Warner players by comparison to the elegance of
the "Time-incers." Steve Ross, for example, "who sees every movie
but never reads a book, calls the author of Madame Bovary 'Flow
Bert.' 18

12. ParamountCommunications, 571 A.2d at 1149.
13. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 271.
14. Id. at 198, 315.
15. In addition, the chief financial officer, the general counsel and the corporate secretary
were also chosen from Warner's staff. Id. at 198.
16. Geraldine Fabrikant, Heir Apparent at Time Warner is Out Amid Signs of Dissention,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1992, at Al.
17. He is a graduate of the University of Chicago. One of Clurman's non-journalistic claims
to fame is his recurring role in the sailing adventures of William F. Buckley. See WILLIAM F.
BUCKLEY, RACING THROUGH PARADISE (1987); WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, ATLANTIC HIGH
(1982) (each recounting transcontinental sailing trips of considerable elan).
18. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 26.
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Cheap shots like these, however, reveal a fundamental truth about
the Time-Warner merger which Time's directors should have seen
from the beginning, and that is that merging vastly differing corporate
cultures is likely to come to grief. Time-Warner was not just a "cormarriage,"19 and Ross and Nicholas not merely an
porate interfaith
"odd couple. ' 2° Rather, the merger of Time and Warner brought together a combustible mixture of personalities and values. Time's board
should have recognized that "Warner and Time were as different from
each other - in their people and their products - as the scrappy old
Brooklyn Dodgers and the haughty old New York Yankees. Different
21
leagues, different managers, different fans - same hometown. '
Another recurring theme in Clurman's book is the romantic but
misguided notion that a news-gathering organization has some inviolable right of self-determination and should be beyond the reach of
corporate discipline.22 Time's traditional separation of "church" (the
magazines) and "state" (the company's publishing arm) took this notion
far beyond the conventional view that advertisers ought not to influence news judgments. Indeed, Time's editor-in-chief reported directly
to the board, and sat on the board, and was insulated by the terms
of a written "charter" that ensured complete autonomy in selecting
both content and editorial personnel.Rather than recognizing it for what it was - the lowest-commondenominator of American journalism - Time's managers honestly believed that the magazine represented some sort of "mission ' ' 24 and that
Time held some unique "bond of trust" with the American public.25
The grandiosity of Time's management on this issue colored the negotiations with Warner at every step of the way. Time had to be per2
ceived as the surviving company, the flagship of the media empire;

19. Id. at 15.
20. Roger Cohen, A Divorce in the Executive Suite, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1992, at D1.
21. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 26.
22. News gatherers at the television networks suffered from the same misapprehension
until corporate belt-tightening was imposed on them following the TV takeovers of the mid-1980s.
See KEN AULETTA, THREE BLIND MICE: HOW THE TV NETWORKS LOST THEIR WAY
(1991) (describing the aftermath of the takeovers of CBS by Larry Tisch, of ABC by Capital
Cities and of NBC by General Electric).
23. The "Donovan Charter" took effect in 1978, shortly before editor-in-chief Hedley Donovan, who had succeeded Luce, stepped down in favor of Henry Grunwald. CI.URMAN, S14p)TI
note 1, at 40.
24. Id. at 36.
25. Id. at 221. Hedley Donovan took a more poetic view of Time's uniqueness. "This 'company' is not just a legal or business entity," he said. "I am also using the word in the older
sense, as in company of scholars, adventurers, or a company of voyagers." Id. at 202.
26. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1145.
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Time's editor-in-chief had to be assured a seat on the combined companies' board.2 This kind of posturing led Time's directors to overlook
some of the more significant features of the deal, such as which of
the merger partners would in fact be the surviving company, who
would control the significant committees of the new board, 2 and what
the strategic focus of Time-Warner would be.
The real lesson of To the End of Time centers on the role of the
Time board and its failure to take seriously its fiduciary obligations
to Time's shareholders. Clurman complains that the board failed to
interview Steve Ross or to demand access to internal Warner documents before signing off on the deal.3° That is not the point. The
board's failure has nothing to do with whether or not the directors
vetted Warner's CEO. The board's failure lies instead in its unwillingness to recognize the legitimacy of the shareholders' desire to take
advantage of Paramount's $200 offer. The board refused even to meet
with Paramount's representatives to see if an acceptable transaction
could be worked out. 3 1 Contrary to the ruling of the Delaware Supreme

Court, 2 this was not an exercise of business judgment. It was a demonstration of arrogance.
As arrogant as he was, Henry Luce at least had his priorities in
order on the issue of corporate control: .'I am a Protestant, a Republican and a free enterpriser,' he declared. 'I am biased in favor of
God, Eisenhower and the stockholders of Time ....

'-

Obviously, and

regrettably, Time's board did not share at least one of Luce's biases.

27. CLURMAN, supra note 1, at 204.
28. Warner stockholders ended up owning more than 62 percent of the combined companies.
Id. at 192.
29. "The chairmen of the board's key compensation committee (three Warner directors,
two Time) and audit committee (3-3), were both to come from Warner." Id. at 198.
30. Id. at 27, 174.
31. Paramount Communications, 571 A.2d at 1147.
32. Id. at 1152.
33. JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, HENRY R. LUCE AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NEWS
MEDIA 173 (1987).

